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Defining the Essence of Being Human 
Efthimios Parasidis* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, anthropologists have probed the planet to 
unearth evidence that assists in answering the fundamental 
question of what it means to be human. Embryologists and ge-
neticists more recently joined the investigation and have mean-
ingfully supplemented the rich history of anthropological re-
search with detailed analysis based on contemporary medical 
data. Despite a plethora of significant findings that have re-
sulted from these endeavors, lawmakers, and legal scholars 
have often neglected or misinterpreted scientific discoveries. 
These shortcomings have proven detrimental, as evidenced by 
regulatory deficiencies surrounding biomedical innovations and 
recent legislative proposals that ostensibly rely on scientific 
factors to define human life. The goal of this Article is to re-
frame the legal debate of defining what it means to be human 
by bridging the gap between science and law. 
Accurately defining who or what qualifies as human has 
significant implications for a myriad of legal and regulatory 
matters.1 These include identifying the constitutional protec-
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 1. For example, is there a point at which a genetically-engineered, physi-
cally-altered, or pharmacologically-enhanced person ceases to be a human? 
Should a distinction be recognized between an in vitro and in vivo human em-
bryo? Ought a synthetically-created living organism ever be deemed a human? 
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tions that apply to human embryos and other developmental 
stages of human life,2 delineating the scope of patent protection 
for inventions that encompass a human organism,3 and charac-
terizing the legal standing of human-animal chimeras and syn-
thetically-created organisms.4 Articulating clear legal stand-
ards for defining what it means to be human also facilitates the 
                                                          
As Peter Singer explains, accurately defining life and death is not an “academ-
ic problem[] found in the abstract theories of philosophers who remain remote 
from the real world,” but rather has “direct consequences for human beings at 
the most deeply significant moments of their lives.” PETER SINGER, 
RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH 3 (1994); see also ELIZABETH PRICE FOLEY, THE 
LAW OF LIFE AND DEATH 5 (2011) (“The lack of attention to the law of life and 
death is remarkable given law’s ubiquity and centrality to our lives.”). 
 2. An integral component of the abortion debate centers on defining 
where human life begins and explaining whether an embryo or fetus should be 
afforded the same protections as human beings. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 
1, at 5. 
 3. A provision of the America Invents Act of 2011—the most extensive 
amendments to U.S. patent law since 1952—prohibits patent protection for 
any “claim directed to or encompassing a human organism.” Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 32(a) (2011); see also Efthimios 
Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 323, 
400–01 (2010) (outlining history of patent protection for claims that encom-
pass a human organism). While current law provides little guidance in defin-
ing the phrase “encompassing a human organism,” a number of patents argu-
ably would qualify. Id. For example, the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation—which manages intellectual property created by scientists at the 
University of Wisconsin—“owns three patents that provide a property interest 
over a method of isolating human embryonic stem cells as well as the result-
ant stem cell lines . . . .” Id. In addition, Johns Hopkins University owns a pa-
tent titled “Human Stem Cells.” Id. 
 4. In 2002, scientists created a microorganism entirely from synthetic 
gene sequences. ED REGIS, WHAT IS LIFE?: INVESTIGATING THE NATURE OF 
LIFE IN THE AGE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 130 (2008). During a two-week period 
of the following year, scientists created a synthetic virus. Id. at 132. In 2004, 
researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) set-up a 
Standard Registry of Biological Parts. Id. at 133. According to this online reg-
istry, these “genetic parts . . . can be mixed and matched to build synthetic bi-
ology devices and systems.” REGISTRY STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS, 
http://partsregistry.org/Main_Page (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). The goal of the 
program is “to make biology easier to engineer.” Id. Coupled with research in 
synthetic biology, IBM has recently developed a computer chip that is pro-
grammed to mimic the human brain. Oliver Renick, IBM Chip ‘Senses’ Events 
to React Like Brain, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 17, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloom 
berg.com/news/2011-08-18/ibm-chip-senses-events-to-react-in-ways-that-mim 
ic-human-brain.html. Called “cognitive computers,” the devices can “react to 
taste, touch, smells, and sound.” Id. Another IBM creation, Watson, is a “ques-
tion answering machine” that uses natural language processing to compete 
with humans on the popular television show Jeopardy!. John Markoff, Com-
puter Wins on ‘Jeopardy!’: Trivial, it’s Not, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at A1. 
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enactment of regulatory frameworks that properly delineate 
practical and ethically justifiable limitations of therapies and 
therapeutics.5 The public debate galvanized by the 2011 ballot 
initiative in Mississippi—where voters were asked to consider 
amending the state constitution to define “person” as encom-
passing “every human being from the moment of fertilization, 
cloning, or the equivalent thereof”—underscores important 
public policy considerations and the need to accurately define 
what precisely is encompassed by the term human.6 
Although the proposed amendment was written to further 
anti-abortion politics, had the measure passed, there would 
                                                          
 5. This concern is not a recent phenomenon. For example, in 1976, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts banned  scientists from conducting particular recombi-
nant DNA experiments within city limits for three months. REGIS, supra note 
4, at 128. Genetic engineering, which in its early stages, was seen as “unnatu-
ral” and a “threat to humanity.” Id. at 127–28. This directly affected two major 
research institutions—Harvard University and MIT. SHANE CROTTY, AHEAD 
OF THE CURVE: DAVID BALTIMORE’S LIFE IN SCIENCE 122 (2001). Within a dec-
ade, the attitude towards genetic engineering had changed drastically, and by 
1982, the FDA approved the first genetically engineered biological substance 
for human use. REGIS, supra note 4, at 128. More recently, the debate sur-
rounding human enhancement provides an apt example. While a significant 
number of biomedical advancements have been applied to improve the health 
of patients and the general public, others have been utilized non-
therapeutically to manipulate and enhance the structure and function of indi-
viduals. See, e.g., Timothy D. Holze et al., “Doctor, Would You Prescribe a Pill 
to Help Me…?” A National Survey of Physicians on Using Medicine for Human 
Enhancement, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 13, 2011, at 3, 3. Notably, the dividing 
line between therapy and enhancement is, at best, ambiguous. See, e.g., Paul 
Root Wolpe, Treatment, Enhancement, and the Ethics of Neurotherapeutics, 50 
BRAIN & COGNITION 387, 388 (2002). Some bioethicists argue that all medical 
treatment should be deemed enhancements because such treatment involves 
altering the natural course of a human’s life. See, e.g., John Harris, Enhance-
ments are a Moral Obligation, in HUMAN ENHANCEMENT (Julian Savulescu & 
Nick Bostrom eds., 2009), at 131, 152–53. Others draw the line at whether a 
biomedical product results in a characteristic that is beyond that typical of 
human traits. See, e.g., Inmaculada de Melo-Martín, Defending Human En-
hancement Technologies: Unveiling Normativity, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 483, 483–
84 (2010). For a provocative compilation of essays on the topic of human en-
hancements, see HUMAN ENHANCEMENT, supra note 5; see also ROBERT 
SPARROW, A NOT-SO-NEW EUGENICS 32, 33 (2011) (discussing 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis and embryo splitting); Holze et al., supra 
note, at 4 (analyzing physicians’ reactions to patients seeking enhancement). 
 6. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, Mississippi Attempts to Define the Start of 
Personhood, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/ 
nov/04/nation/la-na-mississippi-abortion-20111105; Karen McVeigh, Missis-
sippi Votes Evenly Split over Controversial Abortion Ballot, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 
2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/07/mississippi-
abortion-ballot-voters-split. In Colorado, a similar proposal was considered 
and rejected in 2008 and 2010. Fausset, supra. 
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have been fundamental uncertainty as to what qualifies as a 
human being. By defining “person” as a “human being,” the 
Mississippi proposal begged the very question it sought to an-
swer. For example, the amendment did not provide any guid-
ance as to whether the term “human being” includes human-
animal chimeras and, if so, what percent of human genetic ma-
terial is necessary to classify a human-animal chimera as hu-
man.7 The proposal also neglected to provide guidance as to 
whether a human blastocyst with removed stem cells would 
qualify as a human being, or what standing would be granted 
to the isolated cells. 
The failed initiative in Mississippi serves as a helpful par-
adigm to illustrate the far-reaching implications that result 
from insufficiently defining what is encompassed by the term 
human.8 The shortcomings of the Mississippi definition, howev-
er, are not unique. A few months prior to the Mississippi vote, 
the Ohio House of Representatives approved the “heartbeat 
bill,” which criminalizes abortion once a fetal heartbeat is de-
tected on the theory that life begins (or is likely to begin) when 
                                                          
 7. The transfer of genes from one species to another has been possible 
since the 1980s, and transgenesis could be used to significantly enhance hu-
man beings. See Julian Savulescu, The Human Prejudice and the Moral Status 
of Enhanced Beings: What Do We Owe the Gods?, in HUMAN ENHANCEMENT, 
supra note 5, at 211–12 (discussing transgenic species and human-animal 
chimeras). In contrast to the Mississippi proposal, the German Ethics Council 
recently set forth limitations on research with human-animal chimeras. See 
German Ethics Council Weighs in on Human-Animal Chimeras, 333 SCIENCE 
1806, 1806–07 (2011). The Council approved of mice carrying human genes, 
but not transgenic monkeys with human genes. Id. at 1806. The Council rec-
ommended that three things be forbidden: (1) the introduction of animal genes 
into the human germline; (2) the development of human sperm or egg in an 
animal; and (3) the implantation of an animal embryo into a human being.  Id. 
According to the Council, “[p]utting human brain cells into animals should re-
ceive special attention.” Id. “The council failed to reach consensus on the crea-
tion of so-called cybrids,” which result from inserting the nucleus of a human 
cell into an animal oocyte. Id. This practice has been utilized to create embry-
onic stem cell lines. Id. at 1806–07. 
 8. As one example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused to charac-
terize a human preembryo as a person, concluding that the “preembryos are 
not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim cat-
egory that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human 
life.” Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). Despite this character-
ization, the court found that those who have created the embryo can own and 
control it, thus deeming the human embryo, for all practical purposes, to be 
property. 
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the heart starts to function.9 The legislation does not discuss if 
other human rights attach at this juncture of human develop-
ment, whether a person whose heart temporarily stops beating 
should be deemed dead under the law, or the extent to which 
medical personnel must provide assistance to an individual 
whose heart has stopped beating.10 
Equally deficient is a 2010 Nebraska law that focuses not 
on fertilization or cardiovascular functioning, but rather on the 
ability to experience pain. Titled the “Pain-Capable Unborn 
Child Protection Act,” this statute defines “human” simply as a 
member of the species Homo sapiens and restricts a woman’s 
ability to have an abortion once fetal pain is detected.11 The 
goal of the measure is to limit abortion rights prior to the point 
at which a developing fetus is deemed to be viable.12 By focus-
                                                          
 9. Bill Analysis, Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n, Am. Sub. H.B. 125, 129th 
Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011), as passed by the House, at 9; see Associated Press, 
‘Heartbeat’ Bill Suspended as Amendments Pile Up on Ohio Senate, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Dec. 15, 2011, 9:36 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/open/ind 
ex.ssf/2011/12/heartbeat_bill_suspended_as_am.html; Erik Eckholm, Fetal 
Heartbeat Bill Splits Anti-Abortion Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2011, at A1. 
Detection of a fetal heartbeat typically occurs six to eight weeks into a preg-
nancy. Concerns Regarding Early Fetal Development, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/earlyfetaldevelop
ment.htm (last updated Oct. 2008). 
 10. The account of one patient is telling: 
Richard Selzer, the surgeon who took early retirement in order to 
write more of his cogitations on Life, died a few years ago but, fortu-
nately for us all, rose again shortly thereafter. His EKG was flat for 
four and a half minutes, and no amount of resuscitation had any ef-
fect. The attending nurse wrote the time of death on the chart, and 
ten minutes later noted the characteristic “settling” of the body, “the 
fixity that is incontrovertible.” Then, unexpectedly, the body shud-
dered: “A moment later he draws his first breath. It is a deep sigh 
that might be interpreted as one either of sorrow or of satisfaction, as 
though one precious thing were being relinquished and another em-
braced.” Soon, a tracing returns to the electrocardiogram, and the 
breathing becomes regular. “The room, which had descended into a 
subaqueous silence emanating from the corpse, is now fiercely active. 
All the machinery is back in place, chugging, vibrating, clicking, ring-
ing.” Later, at the weekly conference, people question the judgment of 
death, but the nurses persisted with their claim that the cardiogram 
was flat, and that there was neither a pulse nor blood pressure. 
Margaret Lock, Death in Technological Time: Locating the End of Meaningful 
Life, 10 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 575, 575–76 (1996). 
 11. Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, Legis. Bill 1103, 101st 
Leg., 2d Sess. § 5 (Neb. 2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28, 38, 53), available at http://www.legislature.ne 
.gov/FloorDocs/101/PDF/Slip/LB1103.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Via-
bility, and the Constitution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 236 (2011). 
012 PARASIDIS_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:25 PM 
830 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
ing on fetal pain, however, the law fails to address how indi-
viduals who are incapable of feeling pain should be treated. For 
example, some anencephalic infants may not feel pain even af-
ter they are born.13 Moreover, contrary to the “findings” of the 
legislature, which assert that fetal pain can be detected at 
twenty weeks,14 the best available evidence suggests that a fe-
tus may begin to experience pain at around twenty-nine or thir-
ty weeks.15 
The Ohio, Mississippi, and Nebraska proposals reflect a 
trend of political activism where conservative legislators have 
sought to restrict abortion rights through legal definitions of 
human that ostensibly reflect current medical knowledge.16 
Upon close analysis, however, these measures are more accu-
rately characterized as normative assertions masked as medi-
cal certainties through specious interpretations of scientific re-
search. While normative claims serve to inform the 
construction of legal frameworks,17 the failure to faithfully in-
                                                          
 13. Anencephaly, AM. ACAD. NEUROLOGY, http://patients.aan.com/disord 
ers/index.cfm?event=view&disorder_id=846 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
 14. Legis. B. 1103, §§ 3,4. 
 15. Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 12, at 238. 
 16. See, e.g., Tim Murphy, The Most Radical Anti-Abortion Measures in 
America, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 27, 2011, 2:00AM), http://motherjones.com/ 
politics/2011/09/abortion-mississippi-les-riley. For example, the Mississippi 
ballot proposal was drafted by Les Riley, a supporter of the group Christian 
Exodus. Id.; McVeigh, supra note 6. Christian Exodus was founded “in re-
sponse to the moral degeneration of the American culture,” and one of its pri-
mary goals is “to move thousands of Christian constitutionalists to South Car-
olina to accelerate the return to self-government based upon Christian 
principles at the local and State level.” About Us, CHRISTIAN EXODUS,  
http://christianexodus.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9
&Itemid=37 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). Riley is also the Chairman of the Con-
stitution Party of Mississippi, whose goal is to “restore American jurispru-
dence to its Biblical foundations.” Constitution Party Platform, CONST. PARTY,   
http://www.constitutionparty.com/documents/2008CPPlatform .pdf (last visit-
ed Feb. 20, 2012). 
 17. One of the most salient features of interdisciplinary research is the 
interplay between normative and descriptive modalities of knowledge. 
Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric 
of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597, 632–33; see also Svein Eng, 
Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions, 13 RATIO JURIS 236, 236−39 
(2000) (discussing the fusion of normative and descriptive propositions in legal 
and philosophical reasoning). As Riles explains, a defining aspect of this inter-
play “is that each slips effortlessly, almost uncontrollably, into the other . . . 
spawn[ing] a parallel transformation in the knowledge” produced. Riles, su-
pra, at 644, 647. Whereas Riles’s observations stem from an interdisciplinary 
study of law and anthropology, id. at 650, her observations are particularly 
012 PARASIDIS_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:25 PM 
2012] DEFINING THE ESSENCE OF BEING HUMAN 831 
tegrate scientific factors into legal definitions of human has 
frustrated judicious dialogue.18 With an eye towards reframing 
the current debate and assisting policymakers in structuring 
appropriate definitions and regulations, this Article explores 
the essence of being human by synthesizing normative theories 
with research findings from anthropology, comparative ge-
nomics, embryology, and medicine. 
Although my discussion in this Article focuses on the 
knowledge gained from exploring scientific findings related to 
the question of personhood, I am mindful of the fact that this 
approach may be characterized as reflecting a bias that empha-
sizes contemporary scientific knowledge over other epistemo-
logical lenses. For example, it is reasonable to assert that defin-
ing human is no less accurate if one adopts a religious or 
spiritual perspective, or one that is based on socio-cultural ob-
servations. Similarly, some may argue that an emphasis on de-
scriptive factors, where there may not be agreement on the va-
lidity or significance of the factors, may not ultimately provide 
any meaningful guidance. 
Indeed, the epistemology of what makes us human invari-
ably reflects historical and cultural preconceptions.19 The fact 
                                                          
relevant to an analysis of legal definitions of human. 
 18. See, e.g., Oscar Schacter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 849 (1983). Apart from the difficulty in defining human 
life, scholars and scientists have struggled to find a definition of “life.” See, 
e.g., REGIS, supra note 4, at 156–58. As Carl Sagan noted in 1970, “despite the 
enormous fund of information that [biologists] have provided, it is a remarka-
ble fact that no general agreement exists on what it is that is being studied. 
There is no generally accepted definition of life.” Id. at 156. More than three 
decades after Sagan’s observation, Stephen Wolfram concluded that “every 
single general definition that has been given both includes systems that are 
not normally considered alive, and excludes ones that are.” Id. at 158 (citing 
STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE (2002)). 
 19. See, e.g., DANIEL E. LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE HUMAN 
HEAD 528 (2011) (“Perhaps the biggest challenge is to avoid the burden of pre-
conceived biases and assumptions about what it is to be human . . . sometimes 
explicit, but often implicit . . . .”). These assumptions include “how we test hy-
potheses about evolutionary relationships, and how we evaluate their func-
tional and behavioral capabilities.” Id. Although it may be difficult to resolve 
epistemological problems, information—including fossil, genetic, archaeologi-
cal, and linguistic—allow inferences to be made and hypotheses to be tested. 
Id. Disagreements regarding human origins often stem from various assump-
tions about the significance of available information to the questions we 
pose—not from a lack of information. Id. Further, to what extent does limited 
evidence in the archaeological record for “modern” behaviors indicate an ab-
sence of the capability to think abstractly? Id. For Lieberman, the “best strat-
egy is to be epistemologically cautious about any phylogenetic and behavioral 
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that lawmakers and theorists often define what it means to be 
human through reference to medical criteria is informative in 
its own right. Insofar as legal definitions of human have in-
creasingly incorporated medical factors (as evidenced by the 
aforementioned anti-abortion measures), the framing of the de-
bate has shifted away from a theological or philosophical in-
quiry and towards a scientific examination. That this shift is 
largely motivated by activists who typically support a religious 
conception of human life is somewhat ironic.20 
Nevertheless, to the extent that a legal definition of human 
incorporates descriptive characteristics, there is a need to be 
truthful in accurately analyzing the implications of the charac-
teristics and the extent to which contemporary science supports 
the underlying assertions.21 It is likewise important to separate 
the question of personhood from the moral and legal obligations 
that may be owed to each individual. Doing so facilitates a nu-
anced analysis of personhood that is free from biases and com-
                                                          
hypotheses.” Id. 
 20. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 16. For example, anti-abortion advocates 
who supported the aforementioned legal definitions of human have mischarac-
terized scientific data in an effort to promote their belief in “the God-given le-
gal personhood of all unborn human beings.” See, e.g.,  CONST. PARTY, supra 
note 16. 
 21. Editorial, A Look Within, 455 NATURE 1007, 1008 (2008) (indicating 
that a “major challenge for researchers is being objective about a topic as phil-
osophically, politically and ethically charged as human nature” and arguing 
that increased dialogue between disciplines in essential). Coupled with the 
lack of interdisciplinary collaboration, there is significant divergence as to how 
individual nations address the legal parameters of what it means to be hu-
man. See Alexander Morgan Capron & Leon Kass, A Statutory Definition of 
the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 
121 U. PENN. L. REV. 87, 110 (1972); Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the 
Proposition that “Life Begins at Conception,” 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 600 (1991). 
These differences manifest in various areas of law and public policy, including 
regulations surrounding synthetic biology, stem-cell research, neurological en-
hancement and manipulation, abortion, and end-of-life issues. See generally 
SINGER, supra note 1, at 3. Although nations have successfully limited treat-
ment and research in these and other areas, in some instances, these limita-
tions have stimulated an underground market and encouraged therapeutic 
and non-therapeutic forum shopping. See John Goldenring, The Brain-Life 
Theory: Toward a Consistent Biological Definition of Humanness, 11 J. MED. 
ETHICS 198, 198 (1985). Importantly, the growing ease at which individuals 
are able to cross national borders, and thus avail themselves of competing le-
gal and public policy frameworks, complicates and jeopardizes the practical 
reach of any individual legal standard. See Nick Bostrom & Julian Savulescu, 
Introduction: Human Enhancement Ethics: The State of the Debate, in HUMAN 
ENHANCEMENT, supra note 5, at 1, 12. 
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plexities that flow from deontological theories. 
With these reflections as a background,22 I divide the in-
quiry of this Article into two questions: (1) at the population 
level, what distinguishes humans from other species; and (2) 
how precisely do we define the life and death of an individual 
human being? In discussing a population-level definition, I fo-
cus my analysis on an examination of anthropological findings 
and comparative genomics. With respect to the second inquiry, 
I advocate a definition of human that is linked to a population-
based perspective coupled with an “organism-as-a-whole” con-
ception of life and death. Specifically, an individual human be-
ing is properly deemed to be alive so long as it is functioning as 
an organism-as-a-whole, irrespective of the functionality of any 
particular physiological trait. Thus, an individual’s life com-
mences when the being begins to function as an organism-as-a-
whole and ends when the being stops functioning as an organ-
ism-as-a-whole.23 
                                                          
 22. In writing this Article, I am mindful of a statement made by Nobel 
Laureate Erwin Schrodinger in his classic 1944 book, What is Life?: 
A scientist is supposed to have a complete and thorough knowledge, 
at first hand, of some subjects and, therefore, is usually expected not 
to write on any topic of which he is not a master. This is regarded as a 
matter of noblesse oblige. For the present purpose I beg to renounce 
the noblesse, if any, and to be freed of the ensuing obligation. My ex-
cuse is as follows: 
  We have inherited from our forefathers the keen longing for uni-
fied, all-embracing knowledge. The very name given to the highest in-
stitutions of learning reminds us, that from antiquity and throughout 
many centuries the universal aspect has been the only one to be given 
full credit. But the spread, both in width and depth, of the multifari-
ous branches of knowledge during the last hundred odd years has con-
fronted us with a queer dilemma. We feel clearly that we are only now 
beginning to acquire reliable material for welding together the sum-
total of all that is known into a whole; but, on the other hand, it has 
become next to impossible for a single mind fully to command more 
than a small specialized portion of it. 
  I can see no other escape from this dilemma (lest our true aim be 
lost forever) than that some of us should venture to embark on a syn-
thesis of facts and theories, albeit with second-hand and incomplete 
knowledge of some of them—and at the risk of making fools of our-
selves. 
ERWIN SCHRODINGER, WHAT IS LIFE?: THE PHYSICAL ASPECT OF THE LIVING 
CELL vii (1945). In dispensing with the practice of noblesse oblige, I have en-
deavored to maintain a respectable understanding of the disciplines discussed 
herein. 
 23. Throughout the Article, I use the words “human,” “human being,” and 
“person” interchangeably. 
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II. DISTINGUISHING HUMANS AS A UNIQUE SPECIES 
Examining the physical, cognitive, and cultural evolution 
of humans as a species provides relevant insights into a popu-
lation-level definition of human. Nature does not provide us 
with unambiguous boundaries between species. Rather, the 
boundaries reflect our method of classifying living organisms. 
Although a number of disciplines provide relevant insights into 
factors that distinguish humans from other species, there re-
mains significant disagreement on what characteristics are 
uniquely human.24 Further, the lack of discussion between dis-
ciplines has resulted in duplicated efforts and foregone oppor-
tunities to exchange relevant insights.25 In this Part, I explore 
a population-level definition of human by drawing upon find-
ings from anthropology26 and comparative genomics.27 
A. THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL RECORD 
Modern-day humans are classified as belonging to the spe-
cies Homo sapiens, which is part of the genus Homo.28 Anthro-
                                                          
 24. Science does not provide us with an “agreed-upon yardstick for how 
much morphologic or genetic difference separates species.” Ann Gibbons, The 
Species Problem, 331 SCIENCE 394, 394 (2011) (“The question of how to define 
a species has divided researchers for centuries.”). As Charles Darwin observed 
more than a century ago, “[n]o one definition has satisfied all naturalists.” Id. 
(citing CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES: BY MEANS OF NATURAL 
SELECTION, OR THE PRESERVATION OF FAVOURED RACES IN THE STRUGGLE 
FOR LIFE (1859)); see also PAUL RABINOW, ANTHROPOS TODAY: REFLECTIONS 
ON MODERN EQUIPMENT 4 (2003) (“The fact that there is a problem in think-
ing about human things, and that part of that problem lies in the inability to 
provide a stable solution, is coexistent and contemporal with the practice it-
self.”). 
 25. See Editorial, supra note 21, at 1008. 
 26. The field of anthropology is often characterized as containing four sub-
fields: archaeology, biological anthropology, linguistics, and socio-cultural an-
thropology. What is Anthropology?, AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
http://www.aaanet.org/about/WhatisAnthropology.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 
2012). Each subfield provides considerable insight into the fundamental ques-
tion of what distinguishes humans as a species. See id. 
 27. Comparative genomics is a field of biological research that compares 
the genome sequences of different species. Comparative Genomics, NAT’L HUM. 
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/11509542 (last updated Oct. 13, 
2011). Identifying differences allows scientists to understand the structure of 
the human gene and to develop mechanisms to fight human disease. Id. 
 28. Colin Renfrew, Introduction: Becoming Human: Changing Perspec-
tives on the Emergence of Human Values, in BECOMING HUMAN: INNOVATION 
IN PREHISTORIC MATERIAL AND SPIRITUAL CULTURE 1, 1 (Colin Renfrew & Iain 
Morley eds., 2009) [hereinafter BECOMING HUMAN]. 
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pological data suggests that Homo sapiens emerged in Africa 
approximately 150,000–200,000 years ago, dispersed to Arabia 
around 60,000 years ago, and reached Europe 20,000 years 
thereafter.29 Homo sapiens evolved from earlier hominins,30 ei-
ther Homo erectus31 or Homo ergaster, who were themselves 
descendants of Australopithecus.32 Recent studies further sug-
gest that Homo neanderthalensis—commonly referred to as 
Neanderthal Man33—co-existed with Homo sapiens in Europe 
and elsewhere for thousands of years.34 Although the extent to 
which each group interbred or exchanged ideas is unknown, the 
fact that interbreeding occurred raises interesting hypotheses 
as to how one species viewed the other.35 As will be discussed, 
interbreeding between Homo sapiens and Homo 
neanderthalensis has complicated our ability to classify mod-
                                                          
 29. Id.; Christopher Henshilwood, The Origins of Symbolism, Spirituality, 
and Shamans: Exploring Middle Stone Age Material Culture in South Africa, 
in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 29, 30–31. 
 30. A hominin is a term describing an organism that is more closely relat-
ed to a human than to a chimpanzee. LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 3 n.1. 
Hominid, the old term, was used in taxonomic nomenclature and differentiat-
ed humans (in the family Hominidae) from chimps and gorillas (in the family 
Pongidae). Id. Chimps and humans are closely related to each other and, be-
cause of this, those species more closely related to humans than to chimps are 
classified into the family Hominini, which means the correct term is hominin. 
Id. 
 31. Notably, fossil evidence suggests that the bones that we currently in-
clude as Homo erectus may actually belong to two species, Homo erectus and 
Homo heidelbergensis. Id. at 484–85. Furthermore, while most paleoanthro-
pologists favor an African origin for Homo erectus, some argue that the species 
originated in Asia. See, e.g., Bruce Bower, Homo May Have Originated in Asia, 
SCI. NEWS, July 2, 2011, at 8. 
 32. See Colin Renfrew, Situating the Creative Explosion: Universal or Lo-
cal?, in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 74,  76 
 33. In 1863, William King—an Irish anatomist—suggested to call the spe-
cies Homo neanderthalensis after the type species from the Neander valley. 
LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 541 n.3. The German word for valley at that 
time was “Thal.” Id. In 1901, the “h” in the word was eliminated because of 
German spelling reform. Id. This resulted in differing opinions concerning 
whether the English name for the species should be “Neanderthal” or 
“Neandertal.” Id. 
 34. See Ludovic Slimak, Late Mousterian Persistence Near the Arctic Cir-
cle, 332 SCIENCE 841, 844 (2011). 
 35. See David Lewis-Williams, Of People and Pictures: The Nexus of Upper 
Palaeolithic Religion, Social Discrimination, and Art, in BECOMING HUMAN 
supra note 28, at 135, 139; Jane M. Renfrew, Neanderthal Symbolic Behav-
iour?, in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 50, 59; Paul S.C. Taçon, Identi-
fying Ancient Religious Thought and Iconography: Problems of Definition, 
Preservation, and Interpretation, in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 61, 
70. 
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ern-day humans as, genetically speaking, strictly Homo sapi-
ens. 
The paleoanthropological record reveals that many traits 
that historically have been associated with modern humans 
are, in fact, shared by earlier hominins and other animals.36 
For example, Homo erectus exhibited behaviors such as tool 
manufacture and the use of fire,37 while Homo 
neanderthalensis fed and looked after severely handicapped 
members of their communities.38 Findings further indicate that 
Homo erectus deliberately buried their dead39 and that Homo 
neanderthalensis treated their dead in a “varied, complex, and 
multidimensional” manner.40 These traits are significant for 
many reasons. They indicate activity beyond physical necessity, 
a heightened sense of respect for both the living and dead, and 
patterned group behavior which may be referred to as culture. 
They also indicate a means to communicate, and provide us 
with hints that some communicating may have concerned the 
symbolic or semiotic. 
In addition to the similarities within the genus Homo, a 
variety of traits—such as the development and use of commu-
nicative practices and tools, the ability to teach and learn, and 
the establishment of intricate social groups—are found 
throughout the animal kingdom.41 Moreover, an early human 
                                                          
 36. See Paleoanthropology: Hominid Family History, COGWEB, 
http://cogweb.ucla.edu/ep/Paleoanthropology.html (last updated Feb. 20, 2007) 
(“Here we see the first signs of hominins (human ancestors from the tribe 
Hominini) whose bodies, jaws and teeth begin to resemble those of modern 
humans, the type broadly labeled Homo erectus.”). 
 37. Renfrew, supra note 28, at 3. 
 38. Renfrew, supra note 35, at 51. 
 39. Renfrew, supra note 28, at 3. 
 40. Renfrew, supra note 35, at 54. 
 41. See A.I. DAGG, THE SOCIAL BEHAVIOR OF OLDER ANIMALS 28 (2009); 
Stanley Ambrose, Paleolithic Technology and Human Evolution, 291 SCIENCE 
1748, 1748 (2001). Researchers have reported that chimpanzees, monkeys, 
seals, and birds have been observed using tools, while gorillas also have been 
observed to bury their dead. SINGER, supra note 1, at 175. Chimpanzees, goril-
las, and orangutans have learned to use American Sign Language can recog-
nize spoken words. Id. See also Bruce Bower, Chimpanzee has an Ear for Talk, 
SCI. NEWS, Aug. 13, 2011, at 16. Dolphins can recognize their own image, 
learn foreign languages, comprehend human pointing, use tools, and maintain 
cultural traditions, while captive dolphins have been observed to commit sui-
cide. See David Grimm, Are Dolphins Too Smart for Captivity, 332 SCIENCE 
526, 526–27 (2011). Bonobo children have been diagnosed with autism and act 
in ways that resemble autism in human children. See Nina Bai, Autism in An-
012 PARASIDIS_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:25 PM 
2012] DEFINING THE ESSENCE OF BEING HUMAN 837 
embryo is morphologically similar to embryos of other animals, 
including dogs, cows, mice, reptiles, amphibians, and fish.42 At 
one point in its development, the human embryo possesses four 
gill-like slits, which is the same number of slits found in fish, 
salamanders, tortoises, chickens, pigs, and other species.43 
Coupled with research into various species-specific traits,44 
researchers often focus on cognitive and anatomical differences 
between members of the genus Homo. For instance, the brain of 
Homo sapiens includes a developed frontal lobe, which is an ar-
ea that is intimately involved in functions essential to symbolic 
thought.45 Symbolic thought, which may be defined as the rep-
resentation of reality through language, imagery, or abstract 
concepts, has long been viewed as a trait that is uniquely hu-
man.46 In addition to Homo sapiens, however, recent findings 
suggest that Homo neanderthalensis also demonstrated ab-
stract thought and symbolic behavior, and that Homo 
neanderthalensis, Homo erectus, and Homo ergaster each “ques-
tioned their position in the universe.”47 
A study of head anatomy provides an additional compari-
son point. Variation in head anatomy between hominins and 
great apes is subtle,48 and the majority of differences between 
Homo erectus and Homo sapiens appear to involve only “minor 
tinkering.”49 Notably, Homo sapiens from 150,000 to 10,000 
years ago are more similar to other like-aged Homo skulls than 
they are to those of current populations.50 Research further 
suggests that many features that differentiate today’s humans 
in various parts of the world are the result of recent phenome-
                                                          
other Ape, SCI. AM. MIND, Sept. 2011, at 11. 
 42. See REGIS, supra note 4, at 111. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See, e.g., Christopher S. Henshilwood & Curtis W. Marean, The Origin 
of Modern Human Behavior, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 627, 627-28 (2003) 
(outlining use of behavioral traits to identify and distinguish modern humans). 
 45. Henry de Lumley, The Emergence of Symbolic Thought: The Principal 
Steps of Hominisation Leading Towards Greater Complexity, in BECOMING 
HUMAN, supra note 28, at 10, 10. 
 46. See id. at 24. New evidence suggests that Homo sapiens practiced ab-
stract thought and had lunar literacy between 164,000 and 120,000 years ago. 
See Bruce Bower, Water’s Edge Ancestors, SCI. NEWS, Aug. 13, 2011, at 23. 
 47. Taçon, supra note 35. 
 48. LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 58. While the heads have the same 
basic plan with the same components, arranged in essentially the same way, 
there are discernable and significant morphological differences. Id. 
 49. Id. at 527. 
 50. Id. at 529. 
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na that may simply reflect random and unselected evolutionary 
changes.51 
Some evidence suggests that the ability of Homo sapiens to 
interpret their own mental state began to appear approximate-
ly 75,000 years ago.52 Insofar as the ability to think introspec-
tively is commonly believed to be a defining characteristic of 
humans, the timing of the development is significant. Specifi-
cally, it appears that early Homo sapiens did not have the cog-
nitive capacity for this type of mental activity or that they did 
not utilize their cognitive capacity in this way.53 
On the other hand, the earliest evidence of jewelry and 
bodily adornments dates back approximately 164,000 years.54 
However, Homo neanderthalensis also produced bodily adorn-
ments, such as “grooved and perforated animal teeth.”55 These 
aspects are significant, as the notion of beautifying one’s body 
through material objects is often cited as uniquely human. For 
this and other reasons, some anthropologists argue that Homo 
neanderthalensis appears to share the capacity and manifesta-
tion of traits that are often characterized as modern human be-
havior.56 Given these and other similarities, including genomic 
comparisons, some paleoanthropologists have argued for inclu-
sion of Homo neanderthalensis under the species Homo sapiens, 
defined as a subspecies Homo sapiens neanderthalensis.57 
Evidence suggests that the development of a distinct vocal 
                                                          
 51. Id. at 527–29. 
 52. See Christopher S. Henshilwood et al., Engrave Ochres From the Mid-
dle Stone Age Levels at Blombos Cave, South Africa, 57 J. HUM. EVOLUTION 
27, 28 (2009). 
 53. See Henshilwood & Marean, supra note 44, at 635 (“The key criterion 
for modern human behavior is not the capacity for symbolic thought but the 
use of symbolism to organize behavior.”). 
 54. See Bruce Bower, Tool Finishing Technique Arose Before Humans 
First Left Africa, SCI. NEWS, Nov. 20, 2010, at 6; see also Renfrew, supra note 
32, at 77. 
 55. Trenton W. Holliday, Comment on Henshilwood & Marean: The 
Origin of Modern Human Behavior, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 639, 640 
(2003). 
 56. See id. 
 57. Bruce Bower, Defining Neandertals, SCI. NEWS, Jan. 15, 2011, at 31. 
This debate has existed for over a century. Id. In the mid-twentieth century, 
scientists drastically altered their view of Homo neanderthalensis, and pro-
posed that a well-dressed Neanderthal would go unnoticed in the subway. 
LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 544. A study of head anatomy prompted this 
change. Id. 
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cord, which is present in modern-day humans and allows for 
the development of language, occurred approximately 100,000 
years ago, while the vocal ability found in modern-day humans 
has been present for less than 50,000 years ago.58 For many an-
thropologists, language (which includes grammar and syntax) 
is a uniquely human phenomenon and, thus, may be properly 
characterized as the defining characteristic of humans.59 On the 
other hand, research has challenged a linguistic-centered defi-
nition of human and has revealed that other animals, such as 
birds and non-human mammals, maintain language-specific 
traits that were once characterized as uniquely human.60 In 
any event, the capacity for language must be distinguished 
from the manifestation of language in material culture.61 
Up through the 1990s, there was widespread agreement 
that modern human behavior appeared between 50,000 and 
40,000 years ago.62 This position was challenged by theorists 
who argued that behavioral and technological differences be-
tween humans were, at least in part, the result of environmen-
tal differences.63 Insofar as hunter-gatherer technological com-
plexity decreases from arctic to tropical environments, this 
could be the result of need (hunter-gatherers in cold environ-
ments must invest more time and effort to hunt and store food), 
rather than any difference in ability or species-specific charac-
teristics.64 
Indeed, until about 10,000 years ago, most Homo sapiens 
lived as hunter-gatherers.65 Accordingly, the advancements 
                                                          
 58. See Leanord E. Newton, What Makes Us Human?, 27 BIOSCI. REP. 
185, 186 (2007). 
 59. See, e.g., Jacques Mehler et al., Why is Language Unique to Humans?, 
in PERCEPT, DECISION, ACTION: BRIDGING THE GAPS 251, 254–55, 276–77 
(2005). For a comprehensive account of linguistic anthropology, see TERRENCE 
W. DEACON, THE SYMBOLIC SPECIES: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE AND 
THE BRAIN (1998). 
 60. See, e.g., W. Tecumseh Fitch & David Reby, The Descended Larynx is 
Not Uniquely Human, 268 PROC. R. SOC. LONDON 1669, 1669 (2001); Timothy 
Q. Gentner et al., Recursive Syntactic Pattern Learning by Songbirds, 440 
NATURE 1204, 1204 (2006). 
 61. See Henshilwood & Marean, supra note 44, at 635 (“The capacity for 
language probably existed in humans well before it was manifested in materi-
al culture.”). 
 62. See id. at 629. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. at 632. 
 65. See, e.g., Kim R. Hill et al., Co-Residence Patterns in Hunter-Gatherer 
Societies Show Unique Human Social Structure, 331 SCIENCE 1286, 1286 
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that contemporary humans are heralded for—which include the 
development of diverse disciplines in the arts and sciences, the 
quest for exchange of information and ideas, the ability to ma-
nipulate and alter their environment, and the creation of global 
systems of social networks and regulations—are recent accom-
plishments that are not found throughout the existence of Ho-
mo sapiens.66 As anthropologists highlight, however, human 
behavior and human culture is cumulative, and thus the pas-
sage of time “is in itself a powerful explanator (through the 
buildup of social knowledge and population numbers) of differ-
ences between human societies separated by tens of thousands 
of years.”67 
Just as farming and computers were not invented by hu-
mans who suddenly evolved novel cognitive capabilities, one 
cannot infer that the invention of tools or adornments, or the 
practice of abstract thinking, occurred because of an evolution-
ary shift in brain structure or function.68 Insofar as there are 
over twenty definitions for that which is encompassed by the 
species Homo sapiens, use of this term provides little guidance 
in defining what it means to be human.69 
In reviewing the anthropological record, we must be mind-
ful not to read our own ways of thinking into the enigmatic rec-
ords of the past.70 There is significant debate as to how re-
search findings ought be analyzed, thus the findings 
summarized herein should not be taken as the definitive posi-
tion of the discipline as a whole.71 Rather, the aforementioned 
                                                          
(2011) (indicating that “humans lived as foragers for [ninety-five percent] of 
our species’ history”). 
 66. See J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Hu-
man Origins and Religious Awareness, in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, 
at 235, 237 (discussing the emergence of early religion); Keith Ward, Innova-
tion in Material and Spiritual Culture: Exploring Conjectured Relationships, 
in BECOMING HUMAN, supra note 28, at 253, 256. 
 67. See Joao Zilhao, Comment on Henshilwood & Marean, The Origin of 
Modern Human Behavior, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 642, 643 (2003). 
 68. LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 584. 
 69. See Savulescu, supra note 7, at 242. 
 70. See Taçon, supra note 35, at 61. 
 71. See Savulescu, supra note 7, at 242 (indicating that there are over 
twenty definitions of the species Homo sapiens); Christopher S. Henshilwood 
& Curtis W. Marean, Reply to Comments on Henshilwood & Marean, The 
Origin of Modern Human Behavior, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 643, 646 
(2003) (“There is no single paradigm, and there may never be one, for defining 
exactly when, where, and how humans became behaviorally modern.”). 
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findings are intended to highlight the difficulty that research-
ers face in arriving at a precise population-level definition of 
human. Though the work of humans has provided humans with 
an intricate understanding of our place in the universe, much 
additional work is needed to unearth new information and ana-
lyze relevant findings in an effort to gain an improved under-
standing of this age-old question. 
B. COMPARATIVE GENOMICS 
As with every organism, humans have a unique genome 
that is shaped by our evolutionary history. Although the Hu-
man Genome Project was “completed” over a decade ago, no one 
really knows exactly how many genes make up the human ge-
nome or the genetic components necessary to make a human.72 
For example, research suggests that each person not only has a 
unique genetic blueprint, but that each person has a different 
number of genes.73 Furthermore, significant portions of a ge-
nome can be missing from, or added to, a person’s genome, 
sometimes with no apparent ill effects.74 
Genetic research supports some of the anthropological 
studies highlighted in the previous subpart.75 The mapping of 
                                                          
 72. See Tina Hesman Saey, Scientists Still Making Entries in Human Ge-
netic Encyclopedia, SCI. NEWS, Nov. 6, 2010, at 5 [hereinafter Saey, Scientists 
Still Making Entries in Human Genetic Encyclopedia]. For instance, the 
RefSeq database, which is maintained by the U.S. National Institutes of 
Health, estimates that humans have 22,333 genes that encode proteins. Id. On 
the other hand, the Gencode database, maintained by the Wellcome Trust 
Sanger Institute in England, currently sets the number at 21,671. Id. These 
figures vary drastically from earlier estimates. For instance, between 1990 
and 1996, estimates placed the human gene count between 80,000 to 100,000 
genes. Id. at 6. Between 2000 and 2001, the number dropped to 30,000 to 
40,000. Id. Furthermore, the number of genes in a species’ genome does not 
necessarily correlate with the complexity of the species. For example, grapes 
are estimated to have 30,434 genes, chickens 16,736 genes, and fruit flies 
14,889 genes. Id.; see also Tina Hesman Saey, Missing Lincs: Lesser-Known 
Genetic Material Helps Explain Why Humans are Human, SCI. NEWS, Dec. 17, 
2011, at 22–23 (detailing the role of lincRNAs, which were once thought by 
many scientists to be “worthless”); Tom Siegfried, Turns Out that ‘Junk DNA’ 
Wasn’t Just Talking Trash, SCI. NEWS, Dec. 17, 2011, at 2 (indicating that 
non-coding DNA sequences, though once characterized by many scientists as 
“junk” DNA, contain codes for making non-protein molecules). 
 73. Saey, Scientists Still Making Entries in Human Genetic Encyclopedia, 
supra note 72, at 6. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Renfrew, supra note 32, at 76 (“The impact of DNA studies . . . 
now documents in a much more detailed way the out-of-Africa expansion of 
our species around sixty thousand years ago.”). 
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the chimpanzee genome has also provided an important refer-
ence point for comparative genomic analysis. Interestingly, 
once the extent of the similarity between the human and chim-
panzee genomes was published, some scholars advocated for 
the merger of the genus Pan (of which the chimpanzee and 
bonobo are species) with the genus Homo.76 
In fact, Swedish biologist Carl Linnaeus, who devised our 
modern-day system of classifying plants and animals into king-
dom, phylum, order, family, genus, and species, originally 
found that he had developed a set of criteria that put human 
beings in the same genus as chimpanzees.77 Since this went 
against the religious notion that humans were created as a 
separate entity—an idea staunchly upheld by the Swedish Lu-
theran Church, as well as many other religions—Lineaus al-
tered the application of his own criteria and placed humans 
alone in the genus Homo.78 Some years later, in 1788, perhaps 
not proud of what he had done, he remarked: 
I demand of you, and of the whole world, that you show me a generic 
character . . . by which to distinguish between Man and Ape. I myself 
most assuredly know of none. I wish somebody would indicate one to 
me. But, if I had called man an ape, or vice versa, I would have fallen 
under the ban of all the ecclesiastics. It may be that as a naturalist I 
ought to have done so.79 
Charles Darwin shared Linneaus’s scientific view that hu-
mans and chimpanzees were closely related. In The Descent of 
Man, published in 1871, Darwin argues that the differences be-
tween humans and some non-human animals are “differences 
of degree, not of kind.”80 Indeed, from a genetic perspective, 
humans are more closely related to chimpanzees than gorillas 
                                                          
 76. See Newton, supra note 58, at 185; see also SINGER, supra note 5, at 
177–178. Despite the close genetic match, divergence between humans and 
chimps occurred between five and ten million years ago. LIEBERMAN, supra 
note 19, at 5. 
 77. SINGER, supra note 5, at 170. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (citing ANN DRUYAN & CARL SAGAN, SHADOWS OF FORGTTEN 
ANCESTORS 274 (1992) (citing GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT THOUGHTS 
(1985))). This view was shared by one of Linnaes’s contempories, Lord 
Monboddo, a Scottish anthropologist who described the similarities between 
humans, chimpanzees, and oranutangs, and concluded that “it appears cer-
tain” that the three are of the same species. Id. (citing LORD J. B. MONBODDO, 
OF THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF LANGUAGE (1774)). 
 80. Id. at 171. 
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are to chimpanzees.81 Similarly, “all of the African apes—
chimpanzees, gorillas, and humans—are more closely related to 
each other than any of the three is related to orang-utans.”82 
Although comparative genomics reveals that humans and 
chimpanzees share approximately 98.4% of their genes,83 and 
that Homo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens are approxi-
mately 99.5% equivalent, these figures provide little guidance 
as to the functional significance of the genetic distinctions be-
tween the species.84 Notably, the order of magnitude of the di-
vergence between humans and chimpanzees is less than that 
between mice and rats.85 As most would agree, however, what 
separates us from chimpanzees is far more profound than what 
separates the two rodents. In this respect, the question be-
comes the extent to which comparative genomics can supply 
helpful information in deciphering what genetic factors are 
uniquely human.86 
Recent findings reveal that modern-day humans in Europe 
and Asia have inherited between one and four percent of their 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 177. 
 82. Id.  Recent legislation aims to phase-out research on great apes, which 
would encompass chimpanzees. Great Ape Protection and Cost Savings Act of 
2011, H.R. 1513, 112th Cong. (2011); see Roscoe G. Bartlett, Stop Using 
Chimps as Guinea Pigs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2011, at A23. As the sponsor of 
the bill explains, “chimpanzees experience pain, stress and social isolation in 
ways strikingly similar to the way humans do.” Id. The United States and Ga-
bon are the only two countries that conduct invasive research on chimpanzees. 
See James Gorman, Chimps’ Days in Labs May Be Dwindling, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 2011, at D4. An international movement—The Great Ape Project—
aims to protect the rights of non-human primates. See GREAT APE PROJECT, 
http://www.greatapeproject.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2012); see also Adam 
Kolber, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and 
Others Apes, 54 STANFORD L. REV. 163, 164 (2001). 
 83. SINGER, supra note 1, at 177. The degree of difference between hu-
mans and chimpanzees is less than that between the red-eyed and white-eyed 
vireos, which are two closely-related North American bird species. Id. Never-
theless, humans and chimps differ by approximately thirty-five million base 
pairs. LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 7. 
 84. See, e.g., Pennisi, Ancient DNA: No Sex Please, We’re Neandertals, 316 
SCIENCE 967, 967 (2007) (discussing the difficulties in using genetic sequenc-
ing to determine whether species interbreeding ever occurred). 
 85. Geoff Spencer, New Genome Comparison Finds Chimps, Humans Very 
Similar at the DNA Level, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/15515096 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 86. See generally T.S. Mikkelsen, What Makes us Human?, 5 GENOME 
BIOLOGY 238 (2004) (discussing a comparative genomics study involving 
chimpanzees). 
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genes from Homo neanderthalensis.87 These genetic similarities 
are not found in modern-day Africans, suggesting that Homo 
neanderthalensis interbred with Homo sapiens in select regions 
of the world.88 Genetic analysis of 40,000-year old bones found 
in a Siberian cave suggest the existence of a third species—
neither Homo neanderthalensis nor Homo sapiens—that split 
from the line that led to modern-day humans over one million 
years ago.89 Called Denisovans (after the Denisova Cave in 
which the bones were found), their genome share four to six 
percent of genes with the modern-day Melanesian population of 
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville Island.90 Remains of Ho-
mo neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens were found along with 
the Denisovan bones found in the Denisova Cave.91 Taken to-
gether, these findings suggest that the lineage of modern-day 
humans is much more intertwined than originally believed.92 
Despite the limited information currently available, and to 
the extent that the evolution of a species has a genetic foot-
print, comparative genomics provides an important framework 
for identifying relevant genetic differences between species. It 
is equally as important to arrive at an understanding of how 
the genetic basis (genotype) relates to observable characteris-
tics (phenotype).93 Given the immense complexity of an organ-
                                                          
 87. Reading the Neandertal Genome, 330 SCIENCE 1605, 1605 (2010). 
 88. Id. But see Pennisi, supra note 84, at 967 (addressing the difficulties 
with proving that such interbreeding actually occurred). 
 89. Ann Gibbons, Tiny Time Machines Revisit Ancient Life, 330 SCIENCE 
1616, 1616 (2010); Laura Sanders, Genes Reveal Mysterious Group of Homi-
nids as Neandertal Relatives, SCI. NEWS, Jan. 15, 2011, at 10. 
 90. Sanders, supra note 89, at 10. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; Ann Gibbons, Aboriginal Genome Shows Two-Wave Settlement of 
Asia, 333 SCI. 1689, 1689 (2011); A New Ancestor for Homo?, 332 SCIENCE 534, 
534 (2011); Ann Gibbons, A New View of the Birth of Homo Sapiens, 331 
SCIENCE 392, 393 (2011). 
 93. “Until we better understand the relationship between genotype and 
phenotype, we can adopt several strategies to mitigate the effects of igno-
rance.” LIEBERMAN, supra note 19, at 529. These include: “avoid picking un-
justifiable null hypotheses”—for instance, “[t]here is no logical reason to as-
sume a priori that an important trait such as language is either unique to 
modern humans or shared by all large brained hominins unless proven other-
wise”; second, “evaluate whether skeletal features contain phylogenetic or 
functional information before assuming they do (or don’t)”—”[f]or a given fea-
ture, this means knowing something about its developmental bases, how it co-
varies with other features, and how it affects performance”; “and [t]hird, . . . be 
careful about variation.” Id. “[M]ore than 85% of our species’ genetic variation 
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ism’s phenotype, however, evolutionary changes are quite diffi-
cult to detect at this level. 
The role of epigenetic factors further complicates the calcu-
lus. Epigenetic mechanisms are heritable changes in gene ex-
pression that are not coded in the DNA sequence itself.94 Inter-
nal and external environmental factors impact epigenetic 
mechanisms, which, in turn, gradually alter gene expression.95 
In other words, non-genetic factors cause the genes to behave 
differently, and this expression may be passed down to future 
generations. Examining the relationship between genetic and 
epigenetic factors has led to new concepts on disease and the 
heritability of traits, further complicating the process of unrav-
eling the genomic evolution of humans.96 
Comparative genomics provides great promise for bringing 
to light genetic factors that are uniquely human.97 Given the 
complexity of phenotypic plasticity and the role of epigenetic 
factors, however, significant research must be conducted to bet-
ter understand the significance of genetic variation. Current ef-
forts to unravel this information are often borrowed from genet-
ic information derived from studies of human disease, 
mutational analysis of model organisms, and gene expression 
profiles. Since these methods rely on indirect inference, rather 
than experimental validation, they do not address the function-
al consequences of specific evolutionary changes.98 Further-
more, intellectual property protection has hindered the use of 
much of this information and has stunted the development of 
the field.99 
III. IDENTIFYING THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AN 
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN 
Although an examination into defining what it means to be 
human is often linked to one’s religious views—and it is im-
                                                          
exists with any given population.” Id. Further, about 90% of the craniometric 
variation is present within any given population. Id. 
 94. Andrew P. Feinberg, Phenotypic Plasticity and the Epigenetics of Hu-
man Disease, 447 NATURE 433, 433 (2007). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See Gerda Egger et al., Epigenetics in Human Disease and Prospects 
for Epigenetic Therapy, 429 NATURE 457, 457 (2004). 
 97. Nitzan Mekel-Bobrov & Bruce T. Lahn, What Makes us Human: Revis-
iting an Age-old Question in the Genomic Era, 1 J. BIOMED. DISCOVERY & 
COLLABORATION 18, 24 (2006). 
 98. Id. at 24. 
 99. See Parasidis, supra note 3, at 328. 
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portant to be mindful of varying religious perspectives—this 
Article will not explore or critique religious notions in great de-
tail.100 Apart from religious perspectives, a number of scholars 
have classified humans as living beings possessing bodily con-
tinuity, cognitive continuity, or genetic continuity.101 Despite 
the intuitive appeal of these perspectives, each fails to suffi-
ciently account for the continuity of all humans. For example, 
throughout the course of a lifetime, a person may lose his or her 
arms or legs or may have a transplanted heart, liver, eye, or 
face. Identifying a person’s life as a continuous body fails to ac-
count for these factors. Similarly, the fact that each person be-
gins as an unthinking embryo, may enjoy a productive life, and 
then may end up as an unthinking person with severe cognitive 
impairment demonstrates that no sort of mental continuity is 
necessary.102 Furthermore, through germline gene therapy, the 
genetic makeup of an individual may be altered, thus breaking 
any sort of life-long genetic continuity.103 Additionally, one’s 
genes may be altered by environmental factors such as radia-
tion, chemicals, or viruses.104 
To the extent that each of these theories fails to account for 
the continuity of an individual over time, a more accurate ba-
rometer is preferred. I support a notion of continuity, proposed 
by various scholars, that is linked to a biological basis for iden-
                                                          
 100. One traditional view, proposed by theologians and described by Rene 
Descartes, claims that the continuation of an immaterial soul is what accounts 
for human identity. See John P. Lizza, Introduction, in DEFINING THE 
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE 1, 2 (John P. Lizza ed., 2009). Often referred to 
as a dualist perspective, dualists claim that “a person could acquire a com-
pletely new body or continue to exist with no body at all.” Id. Building on the 
notion that human identity is linked to a soul, St. Thomas Aquinas sets forth 
an alternative view and classifies humans as “biological organism[s] informed 
by a rational soul”. Id. Under this perspective, “[p]ersonal identity” lies in the 
“continuation of an ensouled body.” Id. The soul and body “are inextricably 
linked,” and the soul is what unifies and individuates a human. Id. 
 101. See Derek Parfit, The Unimportance of Identity, in DEFINING THE 
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE supra note 100, at 117, 118–25 (describing vari-
ous continuity theories proposed over time). 
 102. See Eric T. Olson, An Argument for Animalism, in DEFINING THE 
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 80, 86. 
 103. See Gene Therapy, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Feb. 20, 2012), 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/therapy?show=all (“Gene therapy is an exper-
imental technique that uses genes to treat or prevent disease.”). 
 104. See generally  Feinberg, supra note 94, at 433 (discussing how cells 
may be altered “in response to internal or external environmental cues”). 
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tifying a person as an “organism-as-a-whole.”105 This is a holis-
tic approach that reflects the coherent unity of an organism, 
and views each person as a complex and integrated organism 
whose existence is dependent on the emergent functioning of 
many physiological components.106 
The organism-as-a-whole is not necessarily the whole or-
ganism—one may continue to exist as an organism-as-a-whole 
without continuity as a whole organism.107 For example, during 
the course of one’s lifetime, physical, cognitive, or genetic traits 
may come and go, and continuity of existence may remain in-
tact, so long as there exists an identifiable organism-as-a-whole 
throughout the course of each change. Within this framework, 
this Article will focus on delineating the beginning and end of 
an individual human life. Elucidating clear boundaries for life 
and death permits a more informed discussion of legal, ethical, 
and regulatory issues related to medical treatments. 
A. INTERPRETING EMBRYOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
From at least the time of the ancient Greeks, scholars have 
debated the proper moment at which human life comes into ex-
istence.108 This subpart of the Article will critically examine a 
number of these perspectives, which range from the moment of 
conception to birth. Many claim that human life begins at con-
ception, which occurs when a human egg becomes fertilized 
with human sperm and becomes a zygote.109 Conception,110 
however, does not occur in an instant, but rather is a process 
that lasts approximately twenty-four hours.111 This process 
culminates in syngamy, which is where the genetic material of 
                                                          
 105. See James L. Bernat, The Biophilosophical Basis of Whole-Brain 
Death, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 413, 
420. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 420; see, e.g., JAMES L. BERNAT, CHARLES M. CULVER & 
BERNARD GERT, DEFINING DEATH IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5 (Hastings Ctr. 
1982). 
 108. See generally William A. Wallace, St. Thomas on the Beginning and 
Ending of Human Life, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra 
note 100, at 469, 470 (indicating that Aristotle contemplated the point at 
which human life begins). 
 109. See, e.g., PATRICK LEE, ABORTION & UNBORN HUMAN LIFE 71–107 (2d 
ed., 2010) (“[F]ertilization generates a new human organism, for it produces a 
distinct organism with the active disposition, or ability. . . to develop itself in 
accord with its own genetic and epi-genetic information.”). 
 110. I use the terms “conception” and “fertilization” interchangeably. 
 111. See SINGER, supra note 1, at 94−95. 
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the sperm and egg merge.112 
Proponents of a conception-based definition must be specif-
ic as to when, precisely, a human life begins. Is it when the 
sperm begins to fuse with the egg, when the fertilization pro-
cess is complete, or somewhere in between? For those who 
claim that human life begins once an egg is fertilized—a posi-
tion that many religious scholars adhere to113—to be consistent, 
they must adopt the position that the completion of the fertili-
zation process marks the beginning of a human life. If so, then 
contraceptives such as the morning-after pill do not destroy a 
human life, so long as the pill is taken prior to the completion 
of the fertilization process. 
Complicating this analysis is the phenomenon of partheno-
genesis, where an embryo is produced without sperm.114 While 
parthenogenesis occurs naturally in various species, scientists 
have used parthenogenesis to create human embryos.115 Using 
fertilization as the moment when human life begins leads to 
the absurd conclusion that some human embryos (i.e., those 
produced through fertilization) are alive while others human 
embryos (i.e., those produced through parthenogenesis) are not 
because there is no fertilization process for 
parthenogenetically-produced human embryos. 
Following fertilization, the zygote begins to divide, with 
each division occurring approximately every twenty-four 
hours.116 Up to the eight-cell stage, each single cell may proper-
ly be viewed as an individual entity in the sense that there is 
no fusion between the cells.117 Rather, the zygote is a loose col-
lection of distinct cells held together by the zona pellucida, 
                                                          
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., An Absolute Value in History, in THE 
MORALITY OF ABORTION: LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (John T. 
Noonan, Jr. ed., 1970). 
 114. H. M. Fangerau, Can Artificial Parthenogenesis Sidestep Ethical Pit-
falls in Human Therapeutic Cloning? An Historical Perspective, 31 J. MED. 
ETHICS 733, 733 (2004). 
 115. See generally id. (explaining that while embryos can be obtained from 
unfertilized eggs, they will not grow into viable humans because the two nec-
essary gene sets are missing). 
 116. Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Individuals, Humans and Persons: The 
Issue of Moral Status, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra 
note 100, at 294, 343; Human Early Embryo Development, SABIOSCIENCES, 
http://www.sabiosciences.com/pathway.php?sn=Human_Early_Embryo_Develo
pment (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 117. Kuhse & Singer, supra note 116, at 342. 
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which is the outer membrane of the egg.118 Each of these early 
cells is totipotent, which means that each has the potential to 
produce an entirely new organism.119 Around day fourteen after 
fertilization, the primitive streak develops, resulting in a loss of 
totipotency.120 
Prior to the primitive streak, identical twins can develop 
from a single zygote.121 Of course, twins may also form when 
two eggs are fertilized and two zygotes produced.122 In some in-
stances, the zygotes combine, forming a chimera, and continue 
to develop as a single organism.123 Under these circumstances, 
continuity as a distinct individual may be traced to some period 
after fertilization and prior to, or at, the primitive streak stage. 
Since the zygote’s development does not immediately dif-
ferentiate the cells that form the embryo from those that form 
the placenta and other tissues, a zygote, in and of itself, is ar-
guably too indeterminate to constitute a real and ongoing hu-
man individual. For these reasons, a number of bioethicists 
maintain that a human life cannot be said to exist prior to the 
primitive streak stage.124 
A recent decision by the German Supreme Court highlights 
further practical concerns of defining human life prior to the 
primitive streak stage.125 The German high court recently ac-
quitted a doctor who performed pre-implantation genetic 
screening in his clinic.126 Notably, the doctor reported himself 
to authorities in an effort to seek clarification of German law.127 
                                                          
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. Totipotency also refers to the ability of a cell to differentiate into 
various cell types.  
 120. Id. at 324. 
 121. See, e.g., id. at 341. 
 122. See, e.g., id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Germain Grisez, When Do People Begin?, in DEFINING THE 
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 294, 303. Similarly, some 
Catholic priests have been troubled by the fact that twinning can occur after 
conception. SINGER, supra note 5, at 94. This position was set forth by Father 
Norman Ford, Master of Melbourne’s Catholic Theological College. Father 
Ford concluded that, so long as twinning is a possibility, the cluster of cells 
does not constitute an individual organism. Id. His position has been neither 
accepted, nor condemned, by the Catholic Church. Id. 
 125. Federal Supreme Court Allows Preimplantation Diagnosis, 
BIOTECHNOLOGIE (July 14, 2010), http://www.biotechnologie.de/BIO/Navig 
ation/EN/root,did=113700.html. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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The German court limited use of the screening for detection of 
serious diseases, and specifically indicated that the method 
could not be utilized to select for eye color, hair color, or gender, 
noting that the law does not permit “designer babies.”128 
Although in utero genetic screening and pre-implantation 
genetic diagnosis often require the removal of one or more to-
tipotent cells, the court did not discuss whether the practice 
kills a potential human being or whether the removed cells 
equate to human life. These screening methods are commonly 
used in a number of nations for disease-based testing, including 
the United States, United Kingdom, and a majority of EU na-
tions, while a number of other nations have no policy that di-
rectly prohibits use for non-disease selection factors.129 Do such 
screening methods constitute legalized eugenics or intelligent 
use of reproductive technologies? 
Some guidance may come from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, which is considering the precise definition of 
the term “human embryo.”130 Specifically, the court is set to de-
termine “the earliest stage of the human body.”131 In connection 
with the case, the court’s Advocate General (AG) issued a non-
binding opinion in which it argued that the term human em-
bryo “must be interpreted as matter which has the capacity to 
develop into a complete human being.”132 According to the AG, 
this would include totipotent cells, blastocysts, “[u]nfertilised 
ova in to which a cell nucleus from a mature cell has been 
transplanted,” and “[u]nfertilised ova whose division has been 
stimulated by parthenogenesis insofar as totipotent cells would 
be obtained in that way.”133 
In addition to fertilization and the primitive streak stage, 
viability is a stage of fetal development that is often cited as a 
defining line as to where human life begins.134 As the U.S. Su-
                                                          
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (“[G]enetic testing of embryos in the womb is permitted for the de-
tection of hereditary diseases such as Down’s syndrome or Huntington’s dis-
ease.”). 
 130. See Societa Italiana Brevetti, Patenting Stem Cells in Europe: AG 
Opinion in Brustle v. Greenpeace, 25 BNA WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. 8 
(2011). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing the history preceding the 
abortion decision and how viability is often used to mark the beginning of life). 
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preme Court has argued, the government’s interest in a new 
life becomes “compelling” at the stage of viability.135 At the 
time of the Roe v. Wade decision, viability was determined to 
exist at approximately twenty-eight weeks.136 However, ad-
vancements in medicine have pushed the stage of viability to 
an earlier point in gestation; Justice O’Connor acknowledged 
this fact a decade after Roe, when she noted that “[a]s medical 
science becomes better able to provide for the separate exist-
ence of the fetus, the point of viability is moved further back 
toward conception.”137 
Nevertheless, there is no consensus on the point of viabil-
ity.138 A number of factors, such as sex, birth weight, and mate-
rial exposure to steroids, affect the point at which a particular 
fetus becomes viable.139 In Japan, neonates born after twenty-
two weeks (as determined by last menstrual period) are resus-
citated,140 while the Netherlands sets the mark at twenty-five 
weeks.141 In the United States and United Kingdom, some neo-
nates are resuscitated below twenty-three weeks.142 At twenty-
two weeks, the most reliable published data suggest a survival 
                                                          
 135. Id. at 114. Although the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade claimed that it 
“need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins” and that it “is not 
in a position to speculate as to the answer[,]”  it arguably did so by focusing on 
viability as the stage of fetal development where the state’s interest becomes 
“compelling.” Id. at 159. 
 136. Id. at 160. 
 137. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 
(1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The point of viability can also be altered 
based on a woman’s access to a modern medical center with facilities to care 
for a premature infant.  SINGER, supra note 1, at 102. 
 138. Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 12, at 237. 
 139. Jon E. Tyson et al., Intensive Care for Extreme Prematurity—Moving 
Beyond Gestational Age, 358 N. ENG. J. MED. 1672, 1672 (2008). 
 140. Satoshi Kusuda et al., Morbidity and Mortality of Infants with Very 
Low Birth Weight in Japan: Center Variation, 118 PEDIATRICS e1130, e1134 
(2006). 
 141. S. Verloove-Vanhorick, Management of the Neonate at the Limits of 
Viability: The Dutch Perspective, 113 BJOG SUPP. 3, 13–16 (2006) (noting that 
a gestational age of twenty-five weeks warrants intensive neonatal care). 
 142. Amer. Health Ass’n & Amer. Acad. of Pediatrics, 2005 American Heart 
Association (AHA) Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) and 
Emergency Cardiovascular Care (ECC) of Pediatric and Neonatal Patients: 
Neonatal Resuscitation Guidelines, 117 PEDIATRICS e1029, e1035 (2006); N.S. 
Wood et al., Neurologic and Developmental Disability after Extremely Preterm 
Birth, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 378, 379 (2000) (discussing resuscitation for in-
fants with a gestational age of twenty to twenty-five weeks in the United 
Kingdom). 
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rate of 1% to 20%.143 Are these fetuses truly viable, if 80% to 
99% of them die? Furthermore, a majority of these infants who 
survive “sustain significant and permanent cognitive and phys-
ical disabilities.”144 
For these reasons, one may argue that, although a viable 
fetus is theoretically able to survive outside the mother’s womb, 
until it actually does so, it is not functioning as an organism-as-
a-whole. Prior to that point, it is reasonable to assert that the 
organism is properly deemed to be a fetus, embryo, blastocyst, 
etc., and thus may be properly identified as life or a develop-
mental stage of human life. In this respect, there is a strong 
argument for identifying the beginning of human life with 
birth, where there is biological and physiological independence, 
and the life is functioning as an organism-as-a-whole independ-
ent of the mother’s body. 
In other words, although a developing embryo or fetus has 
the potential to become a human, and this potential increases 
with each passing day, the actuality of being a distinct human 
does not occur until birth. This is when the fetus moves beyond 
the stage of being a potential human and actually becomes one. 
This perspective of human life is consonant with Jewish princi-
ples, which hold that full title to life arises only at birth.145 Un-
der Talmudic law, the fetus is considered to be part of the 
mother’s body until the birthing process begins; at which point, 
the fetus is considered a distinct life.146 
This position is consistent with criminal law statutes 
throughout the United States, which define a person as one 
who is “born alive.”147 While the “born alive” rule is the norm 
for state homicide statutes, “it has been effectively discarded 
through the adoption of special feticide statutes now in effect in 
                                                          
 143. Wood et al., supra note 142, at 379 tbl. 1. 
 144. Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 12, at 237. 
 145. See Aaron L. Mackler, Jewish Perspectives on Abortion, in DEFINING 
THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 281, 284 (“No Jewish au-
thority views the status of the fetus as fully equal to that of the mother, even 
at the end of gestation.”). 
 146. Id. As Regis notes, a “fetus ha[s] the potential of becoming an inde-
pendent entity with the prospect of a full life in front of it . . . .” REGIS, supra 
note 5, at 163 (emphasis added). 
 147. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 13–26. The “born alive rule” does not recog-
nize a “fetus as a distinct person under homicide law until the fetus [survives] 
the birthing process” and is biologically independent from the mother. Id. at 
14. 
012 PARASIDIS_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:25 PM 
2012] DEFINING THE ESSENCE OF BEING HUMAN 853 
most states.”148 Nevertheless, a larger question remains—
namely, can the existence of the entity, inside or outside a 
woman’s body, “be so significant that it marks the beginning of 
a new human life?”149 For example, continuity may also be 
traced to a point during gestation where the human that is 
born may be classified as an individual entity—something that 
arguably occurs at the primitive streak stage—despite the fact 
that there is a biological and physiological dependence on the 
mother until birth. 
Quickening has also been proposed as a defining moment 
for personhood.150 The theory traces its roots to Thomas Aqui-
nas, a Christian philosopher sometimes described as a “liberal” 
Catholic.151 Aquinas argued that a fetus was unformed until 
quickening, which is the time when a pregnant woman first 
feels the fetus moving inside of her.152 He believed that this oc-
curred forty days after conception for males, and eighty days 
for females.153 For Aquinas, to have an abortion before quicken-
ing was birth control, not homicide.154 Quickening was also the 
point of gestation, under English common law, when abortion 
was a crime.155 
                                                          
 148. Id. at 29. 
 149. SINGER, supra note 1, at 101. 
 150. Id. at 87 (noting that during the middle ages Christian philosophers 
believed the soul to enter the fetus at quickening). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.  It was not until  the nineteenth century that the Roman Catholic 
Church began to widely adopt the view that abortion, from the time of concep-
tion, is a form of homicide. Id. 
 155. Id. at 88.  Singer provides an informative historical overview of abor-
tion rights: 
  Under English law, once a baby moved and, arguably, showed itself to 
be alive, abortion became illegal. Id. This changed in the nineteenth century 
when legislation in England and the United States made abortion a crime at 
any point after conception. Id. Physicians in the United States supported this 
move because they knew the irrelevance of the quickening stage in terms of 
fetus development. Id. This change in legislation was supported by the Ameri-
can Medical Association (AMA), which commenced a crusade against abortion. 
Id. During the AMA’s national convention in 1859, “delegates voted unani-
mously to protest the ‘unwarrantable destruction of human life’” and thereaf-
ter began to lobby state legislatures for stricter laws against abortion Id. at 89. 
There was little opposition to the AMA’s position, and their efforts were suc-
cessful. Id. 
Laws prohibiting abortions at any stage were present in every state by the 
turn of the twentieth century. Id. Although the laws did not eliminate abor-
tions, “[b]y 1950 American public opinion considered abortion ‘socially odious,’” 
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Arriving at a determination of the point at which human 
life begins does not answer the question of what rights ought to 
attach to human life and its developmental stages. For exam-
ple, classifying birth as the commencement of human life does 
not imply that a zygote, embryo, or fetus should have rights 
subservient to the mother or another human being. Such rights 
could be linked to the relevant developmental category of life, 
regardless of whether the rights are categorized as human 
rights. 
B. CESSATION OF THE ORGANISM-AS-A-WHOLE 
The continuing existence of a person depends on the con-
tinued functioning of the organism-as-a-whole.156 Though many 
                                                          
and few called for re-legalization. Id. As Singer notes: “The changes in attitude 
to early abortions that occurred in the nineteenth century reflected a change 
in beliefs about when the life of the developing human being began, rather 
than about the fundamental view that, once alive, the innocent human being 
must not be killed.” Id. at 89–90. In the 1960s, the drug thalidomide helped 
change the societal and legal view of abortion. Id. at 90. In many European 
countries, women were prescribed thalidomide as a sedative during pregnan-
cy. Id. Children began to be born with strange abnormalities, such as flaps of 
skin for arms. Id. Once the link between the drug and the abnormalities was 
made, women who were pregnant and had taken thalidomide sought abor-
tions. Id. at 90–91. The push to legalize abortions was strengthened by a  Bel-
gian woman’s trial and acquittal after killing her infant, which was born with 
serious birth defects linked to the drug. Id. at 91. Meanwhile, in the United 
States, a woman named Sherri Finkbane, fearing that her unborn child would 
have a severe defect after using thalidomide during her pregnancy, unsuccess-
fully sought to have an abortion in Arizona, California, and New Jersey. Id. 
Finkbane was finally able to obtain an abortion in Sweden, which revealed the 
fetus to be deformed. Id. At the time, this event shed a new light on abortion, 
which began to be seen as not merely a choice between life and not life, but 
rather a matter of degree—”what kind of life under what kind of conditions.” 
Id. 
In addition to the thalidomide catastrophe, statistics on the number of 
women who died or were injured during illegal abortions galvanized public 
sympathy for the re-legalization of abortion. Id. “In 1967[,] the British parlia-
ment passed a law allowing abortion . . . performed by a medical practitioner 
to prevent ‘risk of injury to the physical or mental health of the woman or of 
any of her existing children of the family greater than if the pregnancy were 
terminated’” or “if there was a substantial risk that the [unborn] child would 
be seriously handicapped” (this clause being influenced by the thalidomine 
tragedy). Id. at 91–92. By the time Roe v. Wade was decided in the United 
States, eighteen states had laws allowing abortions in a variety of circum-
stances, usually related to the woman’s health, a high risk of abnormality, or if 
the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest. Id. at 92. 
 156. See Lynne Rudder Baker, When Does a Person Begin?, in DEFINING 
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consider the brain to be the most critical system, the body is 
highly dependent on multiple systems.157 “The heart pumps 
blood . . . , the lungs provide intake of oxygen and output of 
carbon dioxide . . . , the intestines provide nutrition and hydra-
tion . . . , and the liver and kidneys detoxify ingested material 
and excrete . . . waste[.]”158 Although the loss of one vital func-
tion may inevitably bring about death, it does not by itself con-
stitute death, though interruption of any vital system for a pe-
riod of time can result in the destruction of the organism-as-a-
whole.159 
Historically, death has been defined as irreversible loss of 
circulation, respiration, or brain function.160 The creation of the 
ventilator drastically changed the notion of the meaning of 
death.161 For those patients who needed only temporary sup-
port, this was a breakthrough technology.162 For others, who 
were in irreversible comas or irreversibly unconscious states, 
the ventilator served to prolong “life” indefinitely.163 Not only 
did this provide grief to the families of the patients, hospital 
administrators feared a scenario where wards would be full of 
patients in such states.164 
As Peter Singer explains, the proliferation of organ trans-
                                                          
THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 384, 397. As Singer 
notes, “if human life is of equal worth, whether it has the capacity for con-
sciousness or not, why focus on the death of the brain, rather than on the 
death of the body as a whole?” SINGER, supra note 1, at 191. 
 157. Bernat, supra note 105, at 422. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.; Michael B. Green & Daniel Wikler, Brain Death and Personal 
Identity, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 
507, 510. Vital signs can temporarily disappear, only to be restored later. 
REGIS, supra note, at 160. For example, there have been false declarations of 
death and premature burials. Id. 
 160. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 86–87. 
 161. The ventilator was developed by a Danish doctor during a worldwide 
polio epidemic in the 1950s. SINGER, supra note 1, at 22. Children who had 
contracted polio were dying because they were unable to breath. Id. at 22–23. 
The doctor created a means of using air bags to pump oxygen into the lungs of 
the children. Id. at 23. This practice was able to prolong life, until one stopped 
pumping. Id. For a period of time, nurses and medical students pumped bags 
into the lungs of patients, which was successful in saving the lives of some pa-
tients. Id. Thereafter, a mechanical pump was attached to the air bag. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. It is clear that use of technologies to support the body’s vital 
functions may prolong life, but the removal of, or refusal to use, such support 
is best defined as acknowledgement of the natural functioning of the organ-
ism-as-a-whole, rather than the hastening of death. 
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plantation as a means of saving patients, and generating in-
come, served as the catalyst for a new definition of human 
death.165 Soon after the first successful heart transplant, a pro-
cedure that was performed in South Africa, Harvard University 
established the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical 
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,166 which later 
came to be known as the Harvard Brain Death Committee.167 
The committee’s first report indicated that the current defini-
tion of death created a “‛controversy’ about obtaining organs for 
transplantation.”168 The authors argued that death “is an arbi-
trary decision” and that their proposal—which defined death as 
an irreversible coma—had “life-saving potential.”169 In defining 
irreversible coma, however, the committee provided conflicting 
definitions including “permanent loss of intellect,” “irreversible 
coma as a result of permanent brain damage,” and “comatose 
individuals who have no discernible central nervous activi-
ty.”170 
Although brain death is generally seen as providing a more 
reliable criteria for death than cardiopulmonary criteria, there 
is significant disagreement as to what qualifies as a diagnosis 
of brain death.171 Many patients diagnosed as brain dead have 
                                                          
 165. Id. 
 166. The committee included ten physicians, a lawyer, a historian, and a 
theologian. Id. at 24. 
 167. Prior to Dr. Barnard’s successful heart transplant, Henry Beecher, 
who was chairman of a Harvard University committee that oversaw ethical 
issues arising from experiments on human subjects, wrote a letter to Robert 
Ebert, Dean of the Harvard Medical School, wherein he wrote that “Dr. Mur-
ray and I . . . think that the time has come for a further consideration of the 
definition of death. Every major hospital has patients stacked up waiting for 
suitable donors.” Id. Notably, Ebert did not set up the ad hoc committee until 
after the successful heart transplant. Id. 
 168. Id. at 25. The first draft of the report was even more straightforward, 
and Dean Ebert suggested that the committee reword its report, which it did. 
Id. at 25–26. 
 169. Id. at 26. 
 170. Id. at 26–27. A report published in Neurosurgery in 1986 challenged 
some of the assumptions underlying the brain death definition. At the time, 
Japan did not recognize brain death as death of a human. Japanese scientists 
found that in patients whose brain had “died” lacked an antidiuretic hormone. 
After using an intravenous drip of the hormone to brain dead patients, the 
doctors found that patients lived, on average, an additional 23 days after 
death. Id. at 54. 
 171. Similar to the remarkable experience of Dr. Selzer, see supra note 10, 
is that of Mr. Cybulski: 
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the ability to breathe spontaneously and maintain a variety of 
reflexes in the esophagus and other areas.172 In fact, it is gen-
erally accepted that the organism-as-a-whole can die though 
the entire body is not yet dead.173 This idea is essential to the 
notion and ability to transplant live organs from dead pa-
tients—it is an explicit recognition that something in a patient 
remains alive despite the “death” of the patient. “Most startling 
is the way in which such bodies commonly react to incision dur-
ing organ harvesting. The heartbeat quickens and the blood 
pressure rises rapidly. The reactions are often so extreme . . . 
that some hospitals” utilize general anesthesia during organ 
harvesting.174 
Some argue that these bodily reactions do not demonstrate 
that a person is alive.175 Others acknowledge that sections of 
the brain can remain active, but claim that these pockets of ac-
tivity have no meaningful significance because “the brain-as-a-
whole no longer exists as a functioning organ.”176 Doctors in 
                                                          
[D]octors in an Ottawa hospital had declared 79-year-old Mr. 
Cybulski to be brain dead, ten weeks after an emergency operation on 
his heart. The patient was about to be taken off life support and re-
ceive the last rites from a priest when, in response to his two-year-old 
grandson yelling at him from the door of his room, Mr. Cybulski, it 
was reported, sat up and stretched out his arms to the child. The pa-
tient was described as not only alive but exceedingly well one month 
after this incident. Apparently the doctors involved cannot account for 
this case; they confirm that the patient’s brain scans showed “almost” 
no activity, and their assumption was that he had suffered irrepara-
ble brain damage. 
Lock, supra note 10, at 576. 
 172. There are documented reports of brain dead patients being kept alive 
for over three months. REGIS, supra note, at 164. In some instances, brain 
dead pregnant women have been kept alive for months in order to successfully 
deliver a baby. Id. Meanwhile, the patient lies in a hospital bed and, just like a 
“live” patient, produces urine, is capable of bowel elimination, and is sur-
rounded by the entire range of instrumentality that would accompany a pa-
tient in an intensive care unit. Id. 
 173. C. Pallis, Return to Elsinore, 16 J. MED. ETHICS 10, 11 (1990). 
 174. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 104–05 (indicating that the use of fentanyl 
and Regitine aims to reduce potential pain and anxiety of the donor, and that 
the drugs may also hasten death); David A. Jones, An Unfounded Diagnosis: 
Revisiting the Medical and Metaphysical Justifications of “Brain Death,” in 
DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 446, 450. The 
wound bleeds just as if the patient were under another type of operation. Fur-
thermore, during organ harvesting, the donor maintains a heartbeat, metabol-
ic function, a breathing rate, a pulse, blood pressure, and temperature within 
the normal limits. REGIS, supra note, at 164. 
 175. Jones, supra note 174, at 450. 
 176. Id. at 450–51. 
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some countries are legally permitted to pronounce a patient as 
brain dead without observing the electrical activity of the 
brain, while others may rely on vague cognitive diagnoses for 
brain death.177 
For instance, for one to be diagnosed as being in a persis-
tent or permanent vegetative state, there must be some irre-
versible loss of consciousness or other cognitive functions. Since 
a determination that this loss is irreversible is not absolute, but 
rather based on probabilities, there is intense debate regarding 
who qualifies for such classifications, and disagreement as to 
whether the specified cognitive functioning is lost temporarily 
or irreversibly.178 One recent study found that patients who 
were diagnosed as being in an irreversible “vegetative” state 
showed signs of full consciousness when tested with an electro-
encephalogram (EEG).179 These findings underscore the fact 
that ambiguous demarcations are problematic when one is 
faced with a clinical decision in an individual case.180 
                                                          
 177. Id. at 449. 
 178. Lizza, supra note 100, at 15 n.2; Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 
Medical aspects of the persistent vegetative state: Parts 1 and 2, 330 N. ENG. J. 
MED. 1499, 1501–1502 (1994). For example, in 2003, Terry Wallis regained 
consciousness spontaneously after nineteen years in an unconscious state. 
REGIS, supra note, at 161. A subsequent brain scan found that his brain has 
apparently grown a mass of new axons and nerve fibers. Id. In 2006, a British 
woman who was in an unconscious state was found to have brain responses 
only to certain words. Id. The widely-publicized cases of Karen Ann Quinlan, 
Nancy Cruzan, and Terri Shiavo all involved individuals who did not suffer 
whole brain death. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 118. 
 179. Damian Cruse et al., Bedside Detection of Awareness in the Vegetative 
State: A Cohort Study, 378 LANCET 2088, 2091 (2011). 
 180. See, e.g., Green & Wikler, supra note 159, at 523. The tragic case of 
Rudy and Samuel Linares provides an apt example. In August of 1988, Mr. 
Linares ran furiously into a Chicago firehouse begging for medical assistance 
for his 6-month old son, Samuel, who had swallowed a balloon. Samuel’s eyes 
had dimmed and he became limp—by the time he arrived at the hospital, he 
had severe brain damage and had fallen into an irreversible coma. Although 
the physicians all agreed that the child could not recover from the coma, they 
kept him on life support for months. Given legal ambiguities as to when life 
support could be terminated, and who could make this determination, the hos-
pital refused to remove the equipment. The Linares’s pleaded with the hospi-
tal; they were emotionally and economically unable to handle the prolonged 
death of their child. Finally, in April 1989, after nine months of “living” with 
an irreversible coma, Mr. Linares entered the hospital with a gun and re-
moved the life support from his child. He then took his child into his arms and 
rocked him for thirty minutes as his child peacefully died in his arms. Once 
Samuel has passed away, Mr. Linares gave the police his gun and handed 
himself over. He was charged with first degree murder and brought before a 
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Since “nearly all brain inputs and outputs pass through the 
brain stem, and because the brain stem is the center for breath-
ing, blood pressure control, and wakefulness,” some argue that 
the permanent cessation of its functioning equates to death.181 
However, the reliability of techniques that measure brain stem 
activity has been called into question.182 Moreover, this defini-
tion fails to account for individuals with locked-in syndrome. 
Locked-in syndrome is “a state of preserved conscious aware-
ness, but with paralysis so profound that evidence of the pre-
served awareness may be difficult to ascertain.”183 For patients 
with locked-in syndrome, although the brain stem and other 
portions cease to function, portions of the brain responsible for 
cognition and consciousness remain intact.184 This condition re-
cently received considerable public attention due, in large part, 
to the experience of Jean-Dominique Bauby, the former editor-
in-chief of Elle magazine, who suffered a massive stroke and 
lapsed into a coma.185 Twenty days later, he awoke from his 
coma, but suffered from locked-in syndrome.186 He retained the 
ability to blink one eye and, through use of the eye and an as-
sistant, wrote a memoir of his experience titled The Diving Bell 
and the Butterfly, which later became an internationally-
acclaimed film.187 
In addition to humans with locked-in syndrome, thousands 
of anencephalic infants are born each year.188 Anencephaly is a 
severe and uniformly fatal abnormality resulting in the congen-
ital absence of a skull, scalp and forebrain.189 At the time of 
                                                          
grand jury. Dirk Johnson, Questions of Law Live On After Father Helps Son 
Die, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1989, at 26; see also SINGER, supra note 1, at 3. The 
grand jury refused to indict him, and the prosecutors subsequently dropped 
the case. During the pendency of the case, the prosecutor highlighted the “‘real 
gap’ that has developed between advances in medical science and the law gov-
erning medical responsibility.” Robert Davis, Partee Says He Must Prosecute 
Father In Death of Comatose Son, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1989, at 2. 
 181. Bernat, supra note  105, at 424. 
 182. Id. at 425. 
 183. Id. at 424. 
 184. John P. Lizza, On the Definition of Death, in DEFINING THE 
BEGINNING AND END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 533, 533–534. 
 185. PETER JOHN MCCULLAGH, CONSCIOUS IN A VEGETATIVE STATE?: A 
CRITIQUE OF THE PVS CONCEPT 183 (1st ed. 2004). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Facts about Anencephaly, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/birthdef 
ects/Anencephaly.html  (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). 
 189. Id. 
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birth, there is no functional cortex but only a hemorrhagic mass 
of neurons and glia.190 Although half of these infants are still-
born and, of the other half, about ninety percent die within the 
first week, survival beyond a few weeks has been reported in a 
few instances.191 A comprehensive definition of life and death 
must account for these states of existence. 
Given the difficulty of doing so, some scholars have argued 
that “the true standard of death” is “the irreversible cessation 
of all brain functions.”192 This definition, however, has not been 
widely adopted.193 Furthermore, medical journals document 
over 150 cases of individuals who were declared “whole brain 
dead” who remained “alive” for weeks, months, and, in one in-
stance, over fifteen years.194 These patients “continued numer-
ous bodily functions that are often associated with living organ-
isms, including the metabolism of nutrition and excretion of 
waste, regulation of temperature, maintaining electrolyte bal-
ance, functioning immune response, continued growth, and the 
production of sperm and eggs.”195 
More troubling is the process of decision-making; a majori-
ty of the top neurology departments in the United States do not 
require that a neurologist must make a determination of brain 
                                                          
 190. See Jean-Michael Guerit, The Concept of Brain Death, in BRAIN 
DEATH AND DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 15, 19–20 (C. Machado and D. A. 
Shewmon, eds., 2004); S. Shinnar & J. Arras, Ethical issues in the use of anen-
cephalic infants as organ donors, 7 NEUROLOGIC CLINICS 730, 730 (1989). In 
some anencephalic infants, the top of the skull may be missing above the eye-
brows, and in its place may be a layer of skin. SINGER, supra note 1, at 38. In 
other cases the skull may be malformed or filled with fluid. Id. Other infants 
suffer catastrophic brain damage shortly after birth, such that they can never 
regain consciousness. Id. at 39. However, both types of infants may be kept 
alive for months or years. Id. Both may have a functioning brain stem, and 
thus the infant “may move their limbs, cough, sneeze, cry, and even appear to 
smile . . . .” Id. at 39–40. Can we think of these infants as born dead? 
 191. Lizza, supra note 100, at 16 n.3. Peter Singer presents a challenging 
perspective: The heart of an anencephalic infant is a heart of a member of the 
species Homo sapiens, but the heart will not beat faster when the infant’s 
mother walks into the room because the infant cannot feel emotions of love or 
concern for anyone. The heart of a chimpanzee is not a heart of a member of 
the species Homo sapiens, but it is capable of relating to others, showing love 
and concern. In a sense, the heart of the chimpanzee is more human than the 
infant’s. SINGER, supra note 1, at 205. 
 192. BERNAT, CULVER & GERT, supra note 107, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 193. See id. 
 194. See FOLEY, supra note 1, at 125. 
 195. See id. 
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death, and the majority of states do not require a second opin-
ion.196 Nevertheless, the medical community generally agrees 
that ongoing biological activity in various cells or tissues is not 
sufficient to mark the presence of a living organism.197 For ex-
ample, in some patients with total brain failure, the body still 
“fight[s] infection, heal[s] wounds, and maintain[s] tempera-
ture.”198 Whereas parts of the organism remain alive, the or-
ganism-as-a-whole arguably does not. 
In the United States, the Uniform Definition of Death Act, 
which has been substantially adopted in all fifty states, defines 
death as either an “irreversible cessation of all functions of the 
entire brain, including the brain stem” or an “irreversible ces-
sation of circulatory and respiratory functions.”199 Although a 
determination of either permits organ harvesting, there is no 
consensus on how much time must elapse prior to a determina-
tion of death. The University of Pittsburgh maintains a two-
minute protocol before declaring cardiopulmonary death, while 
the Denver Children’s Hospital requires a wait of seventy-five 
seconds before organ harvesting from children can take 
place.200 Australian regulations require a wait of at least two 
minutes, but no more than five, while Canada recommends 
that physicians wait at least five minutes.201 In the European 
Union, a ten-minute wait is required prior to organ harvest-
ing.202 Despite these protocols, resuscitation of cardiopulmo-
nary function is possible for ten to fifteen minutes following the 
cessation of cardiac output.203 However, there is no regulation 
or institutional policy that mandates a fifteen-minute wait pri-
or to organ harvesting.204 
                                                          
 196. See id. at 129. Examples of improper determinations of brain death 
have been made, though they rarely receive much attention in the popular 
press. Id. at 127–129. 
 197. Those who support the whole brain death criteria note that the focus 
must be on brain function, not brain activity. Id. at 120. 
 198. The President’s Council of Bioethics, Selections from Controversies in 
the Determination of Death: A White Paper, in DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND 
END OF LIFE, supra note 100, at 551, 559. 
 199. FOLEY, supra note 1, at 120. 
 200. Id. at 90. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 91. One patient’s experience, from June 2008, is particularly no-
table: 
A forty-five-year-old man had a heart attack and was rushed to the 
nearby hospital, where resuscitation efforts took place for ninety 
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Marking the point of death becomes particularly relevant 
when one seeks to determine the point at which organ harvest-
ing can begin. Although societies have established various laws 
and practices surrounding dying and death, the event of death 
is a biological phenomenon that can be studied and de-
scribed.205 Accurately defining the moment of death is not only 
significant for the individual and the people close to the dying 
person, it has important implications for issues such as organ 
harvesting, when providers can stop treatment, and when pay-
ers can stop paying for treatment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While biomedical innovations have significantly enhanced 
the human condition, they have also challenged conventional 
notions of how we define human life.206 It may be the case that 
                                                          
minutes. He was declared dead using cardiopulmonary criteria, and 
preparations were begun for organ retrieval. He “came alive” in the 
operating room, and after a significant time in intensive care, fully 
recovered. 
Id. at 94 (citing John Lichfield, Dead Patient Comes Around as Organs are 
About to be Removed, INDEPENDENT (London), June 12, 2008, at 30; Dead Man 
Waking Shocks Doctors, TORONTO SUN, June 11, 2008, at 34). 
 205. See Bernat, supra note 105, at 414. 
 206. Peter Singer perceptively summarized the issues more than a decade 
ago: 
Like cosmology before Copernicus, the traditional doctrine of the 
sanctity of human life is today in deep trouble. Its defenders have re-
sponded, naturally enough, by trying to patch up the holes that keep 
appearing in it. They have redefined death so that they can remove 
beating hearts from warm, breathing bodies, and give them to others 
with better prospects, while telling themselves that they are only tak-
ing organs from a corpse. They have drawn a distinction between ‘or-
dinary’ and ‘extraordinary’ means of treatment, which allows them to 
persuade themselves that their decision to withdraw a respirator 
from a person in an irreversible coma has nothing to do with the pa-
tient’s poor quality of life. They give terminally ill patients huge doses 
of morphine that they know will shorten their lives, but say that this 
is not euthanasia, because their declared intention is to relieve pain. 
They select severely disabled infants for ‘non-treatment’ and make 
sure they die, without thinking of themselves as killing them. By 
denying that an individual human being comes into existence before 
birth, the more flexible adherents of the sanctity of life doctrine are 
able to put the life, health, and well-being of a woman ahead of that of 
a fetus. Finally, by putting a taboo on comparisons between intellec-
tually disabled human beings and nonhuman animals, they have pre-
served the species boundary as the boundary of the sanctity of life 
ethic, despite overwhelming evidence that the differences between us 
and other species are differences of degree rather than of kind. 
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humans are the only organism that can contemplate their own 
existence. Indeed, some have argued that the human capacity 
for self-definition may be viewed as one of the crowning 
achievements of our species.207 
This faculty, however, comes with a price. The ability to 
determine who we include as part of us has an important moral 
dimension, and we must be mindful not to engage in ontological 
gerrymandering.208 As history reveals, the capability has been 
frequently utilized as a tool to suppress the rights of minorities 
and indigenous peoples.209 Although such historical malfea-
sance has often been discussed, the social, cultural, and histori-
cal depth of defining personhood has been insufficiently ex-
plored. In order to intelligently frame public policy in light of 
technological advancements,210 legislators must closely exam-
                                                          
  The patching could go on, but it is hard to see a long and benefi-
cial future for an ethic as paradoxical, incoherent and dependent on 
pretence as our conventional ethic of life and death has become. New 
medical techniques, decisions in landmark legal cases and shifts of 
public opinion are constantly threatening to bring the whole edifice 
crashing down. 
SINGER, supra note 1, at 188–89. 
 207. Taçon, supra note 35, at 66. Others posit that one of the few remain-
ing features that is uniquely human is “the fact that we humans continue to 
be enthralled with our own intelligence . . . .” Trenton W. Holliday, Comment 
on Henshilwood and Marean: The Origin of Modern Human Behavior, 44 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 639, 640 (2003); see also Savulescu, supra note 7, at 
216 (“As human beings, we believe that being human has special significance . 
. . .”). 
 208. See Green & Wikler, supra note 159, at 515 (discussing the difficulty 
of determining death and how that determination alters the behavior of oth-
ers). 
 209. Lizza, supra note 100, at 12. 
 210. In addition to directly addressing the extent to which medical technol-
ogies may be utilized by individuals, defining who is encompassed by the term 
human impacts regulatory requirements of businesses. Each federal agency 
arrives at a value of human life and uses this value to determine a wide range 
of regulations that include restrictions on air pollution, the extent of warning 
labels on cigarettes, and stronger roofs on cars. See Binyamin Appelbaum, A 
Life’s Value, It May Depend on Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, at A3. Fed-
eral guidelines permit a valuation between $1 million and $10 million per hu-
man life, though the Office of Management and Budget has indicated that fig-
ures under $5 million “would be difficult to justify . . . .” Id at A3. Under the 
Obama administration, agencies set values significantly higher than those 
under the Bush administration. Id. at A1. For example, the EPA now values 
human life at $9.1 million, up from $6.8 million during the Bush administra-
tion. Id. Similarly, the FDA values life at $7.9 million, up from $5 million in 
2008. Id. Since these determinations are ultimately made by political appoin-
tees, the amounts invariably reflect the political agenda of the presiding ad-
ministration. Id. 
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ine the question of how we define human life by methodically 
evaluating proposed definitions in light of verifiable scientific 
data. 
The wisdom gained from the work of anthropologists, ge-
neticists, embryologists, and medical researchers provides an 
important starting point for an interdisciplinary discussion of 
issues such as human origins, human nature, and human 
uniqueness. Though policy-makers must balance competing in-
terests that are seemingly irreconcilable, this does not imply 
that we are incapable of making progress towards consensus. 
Progress requires critical reflection of personal beliefs coupled 
with a thorough understanding of the relevant disciplines, each 
placed in historical context. Whereas some scholars argue that 
we can handle relevant moral issues without settling the ques-
tion of personhood, I think that today’s moral issues can be 
more appropriately addressed if we first have undertaken a 
comprehensive exploration of what it means to be human.211 
While this Article has undoubtedly raised more questions 
than it has answered, my goal has been to challenge the 
framework of how legal definitions of human are analyzed. To 
this end, the findings discussed herein highlight the value and 
limitations of various disciplines. A review of the anthropologi-
cal record reveals clues as to the origins and characteristics of 
Homo sapiens, though the record does not provide us with a de-
finitive statement as to who qualifies as human. Genetics 
guides our awareness of the evolution of mankind and the dif-
ferences between species, yet fails to delineate the significance 
of genetic variation and demarcate precisely where one species 
ends and another begins. Medicine provides us with a window 
into fetal development and end of life issues, but fails to identi-
fy the normative status of where each life begins and ends. 
While current scientific knowledge may not provide us with an 
unambiguous legal definition of human life, critically analyzing 
objective characteristics facilitates an informed dialogue.212 
                                                          
 211. As Darwin observes: 
It has often and confidently been asserted, that man’s origin can nev-
er be known; but ignorance more frequently begets confidence than 
does knowledge; it is those who know little, and not those who know 
much, who so positively assert that this or that problem will never be 
solved by science. 
CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO 
SEX 2 (2d ed. 1882). 
 212. In the end, arriving at a legal definition of human may not be the best 
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And thus we find ourselves in the unique position of not 
only determining the genesis of our own species, but also the 
parameters of inclusion into our select club. In order to facili-
tate a nuanced analysis of defining when human life begins, we 
must be mindful to separate the question of personhood from 
the moral and legal obligations owed to each individual. Eluci-
dating a clear vision of what it means to be human permits res-
olution of important legal, ethical and regulatory issues, and 
helps guide one’s vision of life and well-being. 
 
                                                          
way to regulate the use of biomedical advancements. As Arthur Caplan ar-
gues, “[w]hat we must do is take each proposed enhancement technology un-
der consideration and decide whether what it can do is worth whatever price it 
might exact.” Arthur L. Caplan, Good, Better, or Best?, in HUMAN 
ENHANCEMENT, supra note, at 199, 208; see Nick Bostrom & Julian Savulescu, 
Introduction, in HUMAN ENHANCEMENT, supra note, at 19 (“Whether we 
should employ a particular enhancement depends on the reasons for and 
against that particular enhancement.”); see also Clive Gamble, Comment on 
Henshilwood and Marean: The Origin of Modern Human Behavior, 44 
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 638, 639 (2003) (noting that, in the field of archae-
ology, “grand narratives are currently on hold, universal statements should be 
treated with caution, and local rather than global is currently king”). 
